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Articles
Poisoning the Well:
Law & Economics and Racial Inequality
ROBERT E. SUGGS*
INTRODUCTION
The standard Law and Economics analysis of racial discrimination
has stunted African-American thinking about race.' This consequence
flows not from the cogency of its analysis,2 but rather from the conclusion
reached by early Law and Economics advocates, when desegregation had
just begun, that antidiscrimination laws were wasteful and unnecessary.
This hasty, surprising, and flawed conclusion discredited economic
analysis as a means to enrich our understanding of racial phenomena,
especially among African-American political and intellectual leaders.
These leaders now largely ignore economic analysis in favor of cultural
critiques of race's role in American society. Insightful and perceptive as
such critiques might be, however, they provide no substitute for a careful
analysis of race in market transactions Law and Economics had this
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. For their suggestions and comments
I thank my colleagues, Taunya Banks, Daniel Gilman, and William Reynolds, as well as Robin Malloy
and panelists at the 8th Annual Conference for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities,
participants in the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference, and the faculty of the Wake Forest University School of Law. For their able research
assistance I thank Robert Burriesci, Ryan Easley, Mary Ellen Himes, Brian Marron, Janet Sinder, and
Michelle Wilson, and I express my gratitude to the reference librarians who assisted me, Sara Kelley,
Pamela Bluh, and Maxine Grosshans. My gratitude extends to other readers as well, including Lisa
Dornell and Alice Suggs. All of the Article's shortcomings are my own.
i. Others have been similarly affected. In assessing the impact of Gary Becker's The Economics
of Discrimination (2d ed. I71), a leading commentator concluded that the book "succeeded in
inhibiting the minds of economists in a way that seemed to stifle further theoretical developments in
much the way that weeds stifle the growth of more desirable vegetation." I THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 616 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter PALGRAVE].
2. Errors in its analysis are the subject of Part I, infra.
3. In Devon Carbado & G. Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory:
Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1778 (2003) (book
review), the authors make a similar observation: "To the extent that identity privileges are a function
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pernicious impact despite offering a fundamentally flawed analysis.
Many have critiqued its assumptions (far better than I am able), but the
analysis erred, even accepting contestable assumptions, because it
ignored the possibility that victims of discrimination could have psychic
losses.
As a discipline, economics has become strongly identified with
conservative justifications for the validity and inevitability of persistent
inequality. Economists restrict their analysis of racial discrimination in
market transactions to labor markets, a well developed field. They
devote virtually no effort to the effects of racial discrimination in
commercial transactions, the choices by business firms of their customers
and suppliers. The result has been to impoverish our understanding of
race and commercial transactions and leave a gaping hole in the policy
agenda aiming to create greater equality of opportunity.
Given the wealth and power of the business community, racial
discrimination in this sector ought to be of paramount concern. Private
business firms account for four fifths of all economic activity.4 Exclusion
or disadvantage in such a significant economic sphere must create major
distortions in political participation, popular culture, self-employment,
personal income, and especially aggregate wealth.
Over the past several decades, federal, state, and local governments
have enacted an array of laws designed to address racial inequalities in
education, housing, and employment. Yet the racial landscape has
changed little in half a century. Nationwide, levels of both school and
residential segregation show little sign of significant change.' Despite a
legal revolution in civil rights, income inequalities have persisted within
the same narrow range for many decades.6 Perhaps these disparities have
of, and help to entrench, discrimination, the question is how to dismantle them. None of the essays in
A New Critical Race Theory articulates an answer."
Engineering economic policy is fraught with examples of unintended consequences, but
compared to cultural policy interventions which involve far more complicated and dimly perceived
phenomena, economics is comparatively precise. One major scholar, Richard Delgado, has criticized
much critical scholarship for being focused "almost exclusively on discourse at the expense of power,
history, and similar material determinants of minority-group fortunes." Richard Delgado, Crossroads
and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writings About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 122
(2003); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven: "A Critical Examination of Recent Writing
About Race, " 82 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2004) (in a rejoinder).
4. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic
Product, available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipawebfTableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&FirstYear
=2004&LastYear=2005&Freq=Qtr (last revised Oct. 28, 2005). Government activity accounts for
roughly twenty percent of GDP. Id.
5. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 86 (1993) (discussing continuing residential segregation); Gary
Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN
v. BOARD OFEDUCATION I (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996).
6. See infra note go.
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been intractable because racial disparities in levels of business revenues
dwarf those in levels of income by orders of magnitude.
Furthermore, no federal, state, or local legislation has ever
prohibited racial discrimination in commercial transactions between
business firms. Since race has proved an enduring barrier in housing,
education, employment, and other areas-despite laws that actually
prohibit discrimination-its influence on business activity likely
continues unabated. Legal toleration of business discrimination makes
the paucity of our economic understanding of the effects of race on
commercial transactions especially pernicious. If reducing racial
inequality requires a substantially larger African-American business
presence in the economy, and discrimination inhibits the growth of that
presence, then what policies might reduce discrimination? To eliminate
racial discrimination from commercial transactions, we cannot simply
prohibit it; more is required.
The requirements of a market economy make prohibitions against
racial discrimination in private commercial transactions impractical,7
because effective enforcement would necessitate abandoning the market
economy. Because prohibition is unavailable, market incentives remain
the only force available to erode racial barriers to commercial
transactions, and these must not offend equal protection doctrine. Yet
devising market interventions presupposes a sophisticated understanding
of the way race affects market transactions, and we currently lack the
necessary comprehension.
Market interventions that encourage African-American business
development must consider not only the direct effects of market
incentives, but also the possible responses of a dynamic marketplace as
all economic actors, not just the intended beneficiaries, seek to exploit
the opportunities these incentives provide. The evolving nature of the
way race operates in our society, combined with the continual addition of
new ethnic groups to the mix, further compounds the analytical difficulty.
Without a sophisticated understanding of the way race and markets
interact, mobilizing political constituencies and convincing them to
commit to long term interventions which promise only slow cumulative
progress becomes extremely difficult. These constituencies have, and
should have, reasonable doubts that the policies will work as intended.
Further, the inherent difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the
7. Without imposing the procedures generally found in public procurement, i.e., public notice of
bid opportunities, public award of bids on a sealed basis, and an obligation by customers to accept the
low bid, victims of discrimination have no way to learn the information needed to submit a meaningful
and timely bid, learn why their bids were not accepted, or even whether their bid was more favorable.
Even with these procedures in public procurement, no plaintiff has ever succeeded with a claim of
business discrimination. For a more complete discussion, see Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination
in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 1257, 1284-87 (991).
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audience whose political support is sought distrusts the discipline used to
identify desirable policies.
Law and Economics is not solely responsible for this state of affairs.
Its rash and mistaken analysis of racial discrimination discredited
economic analysis within the civil rights community, but other cultural
factors peculiar to African-American history were at work as well. While
these factors will be discussed in general terms, the principal goal of this
Article is to contribute to the redemption of economics' reputation as a
source of insights into the way race operates in our society.
The schools of economics whose reputations provoke this concern
do not include the neoclassical school of microeconomics, which provides
the foundation for Law and Economics. Rather, the appropriate concern
is for the many other schools whose approaches might enrich our
understanding by revealing the scale and direction of economic
incentives for various behaviors. To refurbish the legitimacy of these
other schools, it helps first to show that even Law and Economics does
not produce foolish results. Thus, this analysis starts with showing how
Law and Economics erred, even by its own lights, as a first step towards
my goal. Having shown this error, the analysis will then correct it. No
claim will be made that Law and Economics, as corrected, reaches wise
answers, or even any particular answer. Instead, the only claim made is
that its corrected analysis does not contradict common experience or
preach lunacy.
Part I of this paper presents the mistake that Law and Economics
made: a gross oversight in its analysis of a factor that while in plain view
was invisible. Remarkably, even those who argued strenuously against
the Law and Economics approach experienced the same blind spot. This
Part also attempts to account for why the oversight occurred. It finds a
partial explanation in the evolution of the analysis, during which
insufficient attention was given to implicit limiting assumptions
contained within Gary Becker's original individual firm level analysis.
The persistence of the error over the intervening decades invites
speculation about the cognitive and psychological factors at work, but I
have resisted that temptation and leave investigation of this phenomenon
to other disciplines. This Part also corrects the Law and Economics
analysis and extends the analysis, as corrected, to indeterminate results.
Part II identifies the cultural and historical factors that contributed
to the civil rights community's neglect of the effects of race on
commercial transactions and business discrimination in general. It
attempts to explain why the Law and Economics analysis had such a
major discrediting effect on an entire discipline.
Part III discusses racial disparities in income, wealth, and business
activity. It argues that significant business ownership creates private
[Vol. 57:255
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power, and that it is the absence of such power, unconstrained by
political accountability and public scrutiny and legal doctrines restricting
purposes and beneficiaries, that helps explain persistent inequality.
Part IV applies economic analysis to illustrative racial phenomena,
residential segregation and credit redlining, and poses the new questions
that such an analysis provokes. To the critique of Becker's work in Part I,
it adds a critique of statistical discrimination and suggests that
approaches based upon the economics of information collection and
verification might prove fruitful.
This article concludes with a plea for greater efforts to understand
the way racial phenomena operate in commercial markets. If greater
African-American business activity reduces inequality, we all stand to
benefit. Not only will our economy make better use of its human
resources, but our society will experience greater social cohesion because
business is not just a way to make money. It is also a major cultural
activity, and has been since the earliest urban civilizations. By more
closely aligning economic and commercial interests across racial
boundaries, we will also reduce the social and political salience of race.
I. THE INVISIBLE MAN IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
Numerous scholars from multiple disciplines have challenged Law
and Economics on a variety of grounds. Those challenges have
succeeded. The assumptions critical to the neoclassical microeconomic
model upon which Law and Economics is based have been thoroughly
critiqued. Empiricists have gradually accumulated voluminous evidence
of systematic deviations from the rational choice model. Its "neutral"
goal of economic efficiency has been shown to be value-laden and
dependent on initial distributions. Moreover, its methodological
individualism is in fundamental tension with the concept of race,
intrinsically a group concept. I will not review all of this work. Instead, I
will accept the assumptions of Law and Economics as true and show that
it still made a fundamental error, and a fundamentally simple one. It
made an error of perception.
Microeconomic quantitative analysis of racial discrimination began
with the publication of The Economics of Discrimination in 1957, the
doctoral dissertation of future Nobel laureate Gary Becker.8 In Becker's
words, "the major contribution9 of the book is to develop a theory of
non-pecuniary motivation and to apply it quantitatively to discrimination
in the market place."'"
8. BECKER, supra note i. He won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1992. BANNOCK ET AL.,
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 31 (1998).
9. Its lasting contribution may be methodological.
io. BECKER, SUpra note i, at ii.
December 2005]
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Becker quantified and monetized the level of discrimination by
attributing it to a taste by whites for nonassociation with blacks. An
individual with such a taste acts "as if he were willing to pay something,
either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with
some persons instead of others."" Quantification resulted when he
posited that white workers and employers would willingly forego certain
amounts of wages and profits to satisfy their preferences for
nonassociation.'2 The amount of wages or profits foregone became the
quantity, or dollar amount, of discrimination. Conversely, when whites
could not satisfy their preference for nonassociation, then they had
incurred a psychic cost of an equal amount.
By quantifying discrimination in this manner, Becker could
mathematically model racial discrimination, and mathematical models
provide predictions which can be confirmed or refuted by empirical
evidence. This ability to create mathematical models, which in turn
generate empirical predictions, gives neoclassical microeconomic theory
a powerful allure. This allure blinded many legal scholars, who seized
upon this new tool and applied it to long term historical and broad social
and cultural phenomena while ignoring its limiting assumptions.
Becker reasoned'3 that if an employer discriminated against black
workers, there would be two effects. First, demand for black workers
with the relevant skills would be depressed, and with no reduction in
supply, such workers would, at the margin, be willing to work for lower
wages'4 (an employer practice currently barred by Title VII'5). They
ii. Id. at 14.
12. Considerable empirical data have accumulated over the past dozen years in the field of
affective forecasting from experiments by psychologists and economists that strongly suggest that
individuals are not very good at predicting the intensity or duration of happiness or unhappiness. The
evidence suggests that we systematically overestimate both the happiness of positive events and the
unhappiness of negative events. See Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2003, § 6, at 44 (discussing the work of Daniel Gilbert, Daniel Kahneman, George Lowenstein, and
Timothy Wilson). Their empirical work suggests that (consistent with the historical record) the
experience of desegregation would not be nearly as painful and traumatic as whites anticipated. The
further implication of their work is that preferences do not remain stable over time, but can vary in
intensity, contradicting one of the most significant assumptions of the standard neoclassical model. See
also Jeremy Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 8o IND. L.J.
155 (2005).
13. Becker modeled discrimination by employers, employees, and consumers, but most of the law
and economics incorporation and development of his theory has focused on employer discrimination
(probably because Title VII only prohibits discrimination by employers and does not reach
discrimination by employees and consumers, except by prohibiting employers from allowing or
permitting such discrimination).
14. See BECKER, supra note I, at 19-21.
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a)(i) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-[] (I) ... to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ... ").
[Vol. 57:255
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would then be employed at lower wages than white co-workers by
employers who chose not to discriminate in hiring. Second, since equally
skilled black workers (assumed to be as productive as white workers),
would work at lower wages, non-discriminating employers would earn
more profits than employers that discriminated and hired only more
costly white workers. 6 Over time, 7 non-discriminating employers would
either drive discriminating employers out of business or acquire their
firms, since the same firm would be worth more to the non-
discriminating employer because it would generate more profits for a
non-discriminating employer than for a discriminating one.'
Accepting this logic, Law and Economics adherents then generalized
this conclusion to the entire economy and concluded that because market
forces will make racial discrimination unprofitable, laws prohibiting
employment discrimination by employers become largely unnecessary.
("Becker himself was more cautious, and claimed only that 'under
certain conditions' would competitive markets eliminate discriminatory
employers.") 9 Thus, only when governments mandate segregation or
themselves practice discrimination are legal mandates against
discrimination needed. In the latter circumstance market competition
cannot penalize discriminating governments because they, like
monopolies, face no competition.
Furthermore, (the Law and Economics argument continued),
because antidiscrimination laws impose regulatory and compliance costs,
but do not contribute to production or efficiency," employment
discrimination laws waste resources.' To Law and Economics adherents
16. See BECKER, supra note I, at 21, 43-45.
17. The amount of time is not specified. The longer the time, the greater the likelihood that
intervening factors might disrupt the prediction. Even Becker implies a lengthy time period. He noted
the remarkable stability over decades of the relative occupational positions of "Negroes," both North
and South, from 1910 to 195o. BECKER, supra note I, at 156.
i8. See id. at 43-45; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1 (1972). But see
Deborah M. Figart, In Pursuit of Racial Equality: The Political Economy of Rhonda M. Williams, 28
REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 13, 5--16 (2O01) (discussing Rhonda Williams, who argued with others that
employers could maintain dual or segmented labor markets and that discriminating employers could
take advantage of depressed wages for black workers and make extra profits).
I9. Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
572, 576 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2o0) (citing BECKER, supra note I, at 45). The
full text of Becker's statement was "Nevertheless, under certain conditions the equilibrium MDC
[Market Discrimination Coefficient] would equal zero, and consequently, all surviving employers
would be maximizing money income." BECKER, supra note I, at 45.
20. To the extent that antidiscrimination laws ensure that more productive workers are not
discriminated against, these laws do contribute to efficiency. In the firm-specific sense, workers
discriminated against would work in their second or third best roles. If workers face discrimination and
cannot work in their highest value added positions, their productivity is less than their potential.
21. "The aggregate costs of these [Title VII] cases, and of the many more matters that are settled
without litigation, must be considerable .... Title VII may generate substantial costs over and above
the costs of administering the statute .... Title VII may not be effective, in which event its
December 2005]
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these costs make antidiscrimination laws both inefficient and
unwarranted. These costs, they have argued, exceed any possible benefit,
because market competition alone would drive discriminating employers
from the marketplace without requiring any antidiscrimination
legislation. The costs of enforcement thus become unnecessary and
constitute waste. Further waste occurs when antidiscrimination laws
distort economic decisions by causing employers to adopt inefficient
practices to avoid the costly litigation that might result from close cases,
mistaken plaintiffs, and strike suits." Ironically (to their minds), laws
mandating equal pay for equal work,23 part of the civil rights
infrastructure, bar non-discriminating employers from reaping the
enhanced profits that would flow from their willingness to hire black
workers at wages depressed by the discrimination of other employers.
Civil rights laws prevent market competition from penalizing employers
that discriminate, or so the argument goes. Without such laws, black
workers, by accepting less pay, make non-discriminating employers more
profitable (essentially bribing them to forgo their preference for
nonassociation). When more profitable non-discriminating firms have
acquired or driven out of business all discriminating firms, the supply of
black workers would no longer exceed the demand and black and white
wages would equalize (and also eliminate the, wage disparity which
motivated the non-discriminating employers to forego their preference
for nonassociation in the first place). 4
The prominence of some of the initial proponents 5 of Law and
Economics within legal academia, combined with their rejection of civil
rights reforms on "respectable" grounds, i.e. those not explicitly
segregationist, gave immediate appeal in some circles to the general
policy conclusion to which they prematurely leaped-that
antidiscrimination laws were both unnecessary and a wasteful burden on
administrative costs are a dead weight loss." Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of
Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 514 (1987).
22. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 664-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe et seq. (200o). Prior to
enactment of this law, employers could, and usually did, pay minorities and women a lesser wage for
performing the same jobs as white male workers.
24. Having black workers bribe white workers to forego their preference for nonassociation as
employees is more difficult. To allow employers to pay a premium to white workers that are unable to
satisfy their preference for nonassociation, black wages must be below those of white workers. Put
another way, the employer would have to pay white workers in an integrated work force more than he
would if the work force were all white. As a consequence in response to the desire for nonassociation
of white employees, an income maximizing white employer would hire an all black or all white work
force, but not a mixed group. BECKER, supra note i, at 56.
25. Professors Richard Posner (then a faculty member at the University of Chicago Law School
and now a judge on the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals) and Richard Epstein (a Chicago
colleague).
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the economy." These proponents reached this conclusion less than a
decade after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" which among other
things, desegregated public accommodations. This legislation, America's
first modern wholesale attempt at desegregation, encountered bitter
resistance both before and after enactment.s Their recommendation
proposed exchanging the first concrete and widespread civil rights gains
since Reconstruction for the predictions of an economic theory whose
assumptions flatly contradicted common experience. To advocates of
civil rights, this recommendation hardly seemed credible in the context
of an affirmative action debate which included many vehement critics of
the initial efforts to dismantle state-mandated segregation. This
recommendation ignored both American history and the law-like role
played by this era's racial norms. 9 Employment discrimination and even
government discrimination, particularly in the industrial North, were
enforced through custom and tradition, i.e. social norms, which had the
effect of eliminating market competition for the services of black
employees." Even assuming market competition existed and operated in
close approximation to the Law and Economics model, this
recommendation came devoid of any timetable for predicting when
discriminatory firms might be eliminated from the market place. The
26. "To begin with, not all discrimination is inefficient... ; therefore efforts to prevent it impose
a social cost over and above the cost of the efforts themselves." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 337 (4th ed. 1992). "[Tjhe added costs, both direct and indirect, that
antidiscrimination laws impose on employers will be passed on in part to consumers, in the form of
higher prices." Id. at 337-38. "[Tlhis consensus [favoring enforcement of the antidiscrimination
principle] focuses too heavily on historical injustices.., and too little on the economic and social
consequences that are generated by the antidiscrimination laws." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2 (1992) [hereinafter EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS]. In fairness, Posner's and Epstein's use of economic analysis extended far
beyond issues of race relations, which was treated as a minor topic. Much of their use has been a
valuable tool to legal analysis, but it also suffers from the same general weakness identified here; a
failure to examine fundamental assumptions in the light of the policy conclusions being recommended.
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; POSNER, supra note i8, at 294-3o6.
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law was first published in 1972. Its sixth edition appeared in 2003.
28. Senator Barry Goldwater, the 1964 Republican presidential nominee, "ran as an opponent of
mandatory school desegregation and of the landmark Civil Rights Act [of 1964] which Congress had
just passed. George H.W. Bush, campaigning for the Senate that year, came out against the Civil
Rights Act. Ronald Reagan, then a popular conservative speaker preparing to run for governor of
California, strongly opposed it." Nicholas Lehman, The Long March, NEW YORKER, Feb. 10, 2003, at
86.
29. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (995);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 9o3 (1996) (discussing the power
of social norms to regulate behavior and the use of the law in "norm management"). "Social norms are
also part and parcel of systems of race and sex equality. If norms changed, existing inequalities would
be greatly reduced." Id. at 9o8; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUrES (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Robert Cooter, Normative
Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
30. Law and Economics assumes perfect competition.
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prominence given to the Law and Economics analysis and the resulting
policy recommendation, in the context of the political struggle of the
times, had an unfortunate result. Before economic approaches to an
understanding of racial discrimination could be properly seized upon and
developed by the civil rights community, they were thoroughly
discredited.3'
In the view of critics, the initial neoclassical microeconomics
approach to the phenomenon of racial discrimination failed miserably.
Kenneth Arrow, a prominent economist and Nobel laureate (1972)"
criticized Becker's analysis for "predict[ing] the absence of the
phenomenon it was designed to explain."33 It has been criticized for its
"deep flaws, some emanating from its deficiencies in economic modeling,
and some from the defects in its premises."34 Becker's analysis was
ahistorical.35 In purporting to model racial discrimination, it assumed
facts completely opposite to the common everyday "facts of life" of
American society, especially in the South.36 Nevertheless, Becker's
31. I refer here to the tools of economic analysis, not necessarily those specific to neoclassical
microeconomics, which form the foundation for the school of Law and Economics. As I make clear
later, Law and Economics' failure to recognize the limitations imposed by its own assumptions has led
it to erroneous conclusions.
32. BANNOCK, supra note 8, at 9.
33. Kenneth Arrow, Some Mathematical Models of Race Discrimination in the Labor Market, in
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 187-203, 192 (Anthony Pascal ed., 1972). This pithy critique
is also cited in PALGRAVE, supra note I, at 616. Even Professor Kenneth Arrow, who disagreed with
Becker, failed to consider the psychic costs to discrimination's victims and how victims might react to
these costs. This failure occurred despite Arrow's explicit articulation of some of the assumptions
underlying neoclassical microeconomics, his recognition of the complicating role of racial perceptions,
and his explicit incorporation in his analysis of discrimination (in another article) that "history
matters." Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3,
22 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973). Arrow's analysis concluded that discrimination
would survive. "In the end, we remain with wage differences coupled with tendencies to segregation."
Id. at 23. Recognition of the psychic costs incurred by black victims of discrimination would have
strengthened his analysis and buttressed his conclusions.
34. PALGRAVE, supra note I, at 615-16.
35. See Ron Harris, The Use of History in Law and Economics, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 659,
661 (2003), for an attempt at an explanation for the ahistorical nature of law and economics based
upon an analysis of "its intellectual origins, its methodological paradigm, and the nature of its
interaction with other sub-fields of law and of economics."
36. I refer to his conceptualization of racial discrimination as a preference for nonassociation.
Since black domestic workers cleaned homes and raised generations of white children in the intimate
setting of the home, the preference could not be for nonassociation. Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, to8
HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1036-38 (1995) [hereinafter McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict]. McAdams has
rightly pointed out that the preference was for nonassociation as equals:
The key to understanding this behavior is to perceive its subordinating quality. Status comes
about by disparaging others, by asserting and reinforcing a claim to superior social rank.
Under this view, the associational preference model is partly, but only partly, correct. One
obvious way to express disrespect toward others is to refuse to associate with them. But
non-association is over- and under inclusive because one can subordinate those with whom
one associates and because, when non-association is used, it does not exhaust the means of
subordination.
[VOL. 57:255
POISONING THE WELL
methodological insight proved seminal. However, while his work
represented an important innovation in the application of economic
analysis to complex social phenomena such as racial discrimination, its
substantive conclusions are unlikely to be its lasting contribution.
The debate between Law and Economics' proponents and their
adversaries in the civil rights community centered on whether the actual
market would operate as Law and Economics predicted, or whether in
practice it would diverge from the model and allow racial discrimination
to continue.37 Some argued, without any empirical data, that there was no
proof that Title VII had improved net black welfare, and that its
unintended consequences had offset its benefits. Yet the most serious
and overlooked failing in the Law and Economics movement's effort to
apply economic analysis to racial discrimination is its inability and failure
id. at Io44. So long as racial subordination was clear, intimacy did not challenge the reigning white
ethos of white supremacy. The problem with McAdams' focus on status production as the revisionary
factor that vastly improves Beckers analysis is that racial status is a group phenomenon and
neoclassical microeconomics postulates only atomized rational individuals (McAdams argues that
individuals will sacrifice their own pecuniary interests to raise the status of their group). The irony is
that Becker s assumption is marginally more defensible in 2000 than when published in 1957.
37. While the legal literature is voluminous, labor economists have produced considerably more
over a much longer period of time. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 26; WALTER K. OLSON, THE
EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (997): MICHAEL
REICH, RACIAL INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982); Lea Brilmayer, Lonely
Libertarian: One Man's View of Antidiscrimination Law, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105 (1994); Major G.
Coleman, Contesting the Magic of the Market-place: Black Employment and Business Concentration in
the Urban Context, 39 URB. STUD. 1793 (Sept. 2002); Drew S. Days, III, Reality, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
169 (994) (critiquing EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 26).
As quickly as the twinkling of an eye, Professor Epstein acknowledges dutifully America's
history of discrimination against African Americans and passes on. This strategy is central
to the overall scheme of his impressive assault upon Title VII. For it is designed to persuade
the reader that the history of discrimination has no significant impact upon the current
socio-economic status of blacks and their chances for improving that condition, and that
racial discrimination is largely a relic of the past. With this obstacle out of the way, the force
of his overall argument, if not much of his rhetoric, about the blight of government
regulation of discrimination in the workplace seems almost irresistible.
Id. at 169; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993) (reviewing EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 26); John J. Donohue,
III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 523 (1987) [hereinafter Donohue, Further Thoughts]; Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative
Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.133 (1994); ECONOMICS AND DISCRIMINATION (William Darity, Jr. ed.,
1995) (a two volume collection of reprinted articles on this general topic); Richard A. Epstein, The
Status-Production Sideshow: Why the Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, IO8 HARV. L. REV.
IO85 (1995) [hereinafter Epstein, Status-Production]; Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102
YALE L.J. 1 (1992) [hereinafter McAdams, Relative Preferences]; Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor
Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1984); Ronald
Turner, Thirty Years of Title VIi's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV.
375 (I995); Frank McCoy, Rethinking the Cost of Discrimination, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1994, at 54,
57 ("[T]here is no evidence that market competition-in the absence of affirmative-action
regulations-will eliminate discrimination."); Clarence Page, Bias Against Bias Law, CHI. TRIB., May
31, I992, at Tribune Books 5.
38. Posner, supra note 21, at 513-14.
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to consider the psychic costs imposed by discrimination on its victims.39
This failure of perception by the Law and Economics movement is
particularly perplexing because the seminal work that first applied
quantitative economic analysis to racial discrimination began its analysis
by hypothesizing that whites incur psychic costs when they must associate
with blacks despite a preference for nonassociation. The logical corollary
would suggest that blacks might incur psychic costs or psychic income
from the presence or absence of discrimination.
Even more remarkable, the psychic costs to victims of discrimination
were overlooked even by defenders of Title VII who challenged the
market efficiency arguments of the Law and Economics school.40
Nowhere in the longstanding argument between adherents of Law and
Economics and civil rights advocates has anyone directly raised this
failure. Over more than four decades, in all the subsequent literature,4 I
39. This failure of perception is not unique to Law and Economics but is found in other aspects of
the law concerning race. For instance, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., the Court wrote,
"States and their local subdivisions have many legislative weapons at their disposal both to punish and
prevent present discrimination .... 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989). In the context of this statement the
Court clearly meant laws against racial discrimination in business transactions. The Court apparently
viewed the statement as so obvious it felt no need to cite to any judicial decision or legislative
enactment. Yet if the Court (in an opinion written by Justice OConnor) had tried to find a citation, it
would have been unable to do so, because no such laws have been enacted anywhere. The Court
shares this misperception with many in the civil rights community who similarly assume that remedies
exist for such discrimination. For an explanation for the nonexistence of such laws, see Suggs, supra
note 7, at 1264-87. It is also noteworthy that the dissents in Croson, even the one by Justice Marshall,
let the quoted language pass unchallenged.
40. A small sampling of the voluminous literature includes: John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII
Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); Donohue, Further Thoughts, supra note 37; John J.
Donohue 111, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 1583 (1992) [hereinafter Donohue, Advocacy Versus Analysis] (reviewing EPSTEIN, Forbidden
Grounds, supra note 26); PALGRAVE, supra note I, at 615. Even critics of the Law and Economics
approach to racial discrimination overlooked the psychic costs to victims of discrimination. Professor
John Donohue, one of the leading critics of the Law and Economics argument that antidiscrimination
laws are unnecessary, also failed to realize that discrimination imposes psychic costs on its victims. His
goal of demonstrating that antidiscrimination laws are efficient makes this oversight especially
noteworthy. Since discrimination imposes psychic costs on its victims, his strongest efficiency argument
would have been to emphasize the psychic costs to victims, especially since in the more appealing
moral calculus these costs would be greater to the victims of discrimination. The subjective psychic
costs of individuals cannot be directly measured and compared-this was the point of Beckers'
methodology to indirectly quantify it. Assuming individuals have fixed preferences of unvarying
intensity (a critical assumption of Becker and one inconsistent with the empirical data), a rabid racist
willing to murder to preserve his preference for nonassociation might well have greater psychic
investments in discrimination than a saintly victim willing to endure, persevere and forgive might have
in equality and respect. Yet intuitively it seems there ought to be a significant economic distinction, as
well as a moral one, between psychic costs incurred from thwarted preferences for nonassociation and
costs imposed by affirmative acts of humiliation and harassment and especially from direct financial
costs arising from unequal wages.
41. The sociological and psychological literature has for decades focused on the psychological
injury to targets of discrimination. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ii (1954) (citing K.
B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (Midcentury
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virtually nowhere has anyone considered the psychic costs that
discrimination imposes upon its victims. I have identified only five
commentators that verged on recognition that victims bear psychic costs,
but even the recognition of these commentators was either outside the
context of an economic analysis (Alexander4") or failed to realize the
import of their ephemeral insights (Posner,43 Charney,4 Donohue,45 and
McAdams4 6).
These costs were as invisible as the protagonist in Ralph Ellison's
classic novel.47 Yet these costs must necessarily exist. If whites can
White House Conference on Children & Youth, 1950)) (stating that this is "amply supported by
modern authority").
42. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 195-200 (1992) (discussing psychic costs as
psychological injury in the context of moral claims).
43. Posner, supra note 21, at 519 ("[Nlet loss of wealth might be offset in gain in self-esteem from
being freed from direct ... discrimination, but that gain would be outside the scope of the
analyses .... "). If Posner had been thinking of self-esteem as a psychic loss in Becker's terms ("In
Becker's analysis, the costs to whites of associating with blacks are real costs .. " Id. at 515), then it
would not be outside the scope of analysis.
44. David Charney & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments and Discrimination: A
Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57
(1998).
Within the premises of Becker's model, defenders of legal regulation are left to emphasize
the interim costs of waiting for discrimination to be eradicated by market processes-in
particular, the psychic harms suffered by victims of discrimination and the social loss that
results when discrimination reduces the incentives for a group to work or invest in human
capital.
Id. at 63.
45. Perhaps the most tantalizing mentions appeared in Donohue, Advocacy Versus Analysis,
supra note 40, at 1588-89. "Private discrimination is a form of psychological pollution that corrodes
the well-being of both victims and moralists, and excluding these costs from the social calculus-as
Epstein does-would be as illogical as excluding the costs of chemical pollution in assessing
environmental programs." Id. at 1588. "The problem in this context is that any effort by blacks to
bribe whites to stop discriminating may generate psychological losses that exceed the gains from
eliminating discrimination." Id. at 1589 n.21. "The existence of racial discrimination in labor markets
imposes external costs on those, both black and white, who are offended by such invidious
discrimination." Id. at 1589. "[T]he discriminatory firm imposes dignitary harms.., on minority
citizens." Id. at i6o9. See also Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICs 572 (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest, eds.). Schwab summarizes the argument in
Donohue's review of Posner's book:
[T]aking up more directly Posner's challenge to point to a market failure, Donohue pointed
to third-party moralists who abhor discrimination directed against others. Their preferences
are not considered in the contracts between employers and black and white employees.
Even if discriminating employers are willing to pay for their taste for discrimination in
reduced profits, the outcome is not efficient because employers are ignoring the external
harm their discrimination causes these moralists .... Donohue has acknowledged that
economists generally try not to rely on altruism or the preferences of moralists in making
efficiency arguments.
Id. at 584 (footnotes omitted).
46. "[T]he relative preference theory points to an obvious harm of discrimination that is entirely
missed by Becker's account: the psychological harm to the victims of discrimination." McAdams,
Relative Preferences, supra note 37, at 98.
47. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1947).
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experience costs from their mere inability to satisfy a preference for
nonassociation, then surely blacks must incur psychic costs"' when
victimized by discrimination.
Becker's argument explicitly considered, and was premised upon,
the psychic costs that whites incurred when their preferences for
nonassociation with blacks were unsatisfied. Becker devoted individual
chapters to the psychic costs borne by white workers, white employers,
and white consumers. He developed mathematical equations for all these
variants on his central idea. At only two points in his analysis49 did
Becker partially escape from his one-sided perspective and recognize
that blacks could experience psychic costs. But these psychic costs were
incurred as "wannabe" perpetrators of discrimination-when blacks
wished to discriminate against whites but could not satisfy their
preferences for nonassociation-not as victims of discrimination.
If the psychic costs incurred by whites upon denial of their
preference to discriminate determine the wisdom and advisability of
antidiscrimination laws, then the psychic costs borne by victims of
discrimination must have at least equal consideration. To conclude
otherwise requires the belief that blacks do not share a common
humanity and lack the same feelings as whites.
Such a belief was implicit in Posner's expansion of Becker's
approach:
In Becker's analysis, the costs to whites of associating with blacks are
real costs, and a law requiring such associations does not, at least in
any obvious way, reduce those costs. Of course, it makes blacks better
off, presumably by less than it makes whites worse off; for if both whites
and blacks were made better off, there would be net gains from
association and the law would not be necessary.5°
Posner appears to mean only that black financial gains from the end
of discrimination would be less than white psychic losses from denial of
their preference for nonassociation. If black gains exceeded white losses,
then blacks could pay whites to give up their preferences and still have
net gains. So, ending discrimination would become a mutually beneficial
voluntary transaction. However, implicit in his reasoning is the
assumption that blacks cannot have psychic costs.
In Posner's analysis, having paid whites to give up their preference,
blacks would still be better off than before, when they lacked access to
48. These costs would also affect the incentives for blacks to seek work with discriminatory
employers or co-workers or consumers, and no analysis considered how these incentives would affect
the predicted ability of market competition to drive discriminatory firms out of business or create
market distortions. See Part III infra.
49. BECKER, supra note 1, at 31, 157.
50. Posner, supra note 21, at 515 (emphasis added).
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the jobs that whites had." But if black psychic costs are tallied, then
besides absorbing the monetary costs of having to bribe whites to work
with them, they would still have the additional psychic costs of the
humiliation of having had to pay whites for that "privilege."52
From Posner's perspective, psychic costs are only incurred with the
passage of antidiscrimination laws that deny whites their preferences.
But when black psychic costs as victims of discrimination are considered,
then prior to the enactment of these laws they have both psychic costs
from the denial of their preference to be treated with equality as well as
the financial costs imposed by discriminatory terms of employment.
Law and Economics has some explaining to do. It hypothesized a
white population that realized psychic income from its associational
preferences, but failed even to consider that African-Americans might
incur psychic losses from those same white associational preferences.
Why the flip side of the psychic coin never warranted examination is
puzzling. Such a glaring lack of symmetry in the analysis escaped
identification over several decades of criticism and rejoinder. It fairly
demands explanation.53
The methodologies of economic analysis, specifically, the practice of
neglecting to explicitly articulate the underlying assumptions of
microeconomics, probably contributed to this oversight. Becker analyzed
the effects of discrimination by the employers, employees, and customers
on an individual firm. His analysis focused on the effects on the
individual firm's profitability, caused either by discrimination against
more productive African-American workers, which raised firm labor
costs and reduced profitability, or caused by not discriminating and
51. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. This aggregation would not work. Even if an
employer were nondiscriminatory, if its white employees were not, the result under Becker's analysis
would be monoracial work forces. Posner assumes that the psychic stakes to each side are equal on an
individual basis. Consider the integration of Central High School in Little Rock. Thousands of white
students felt very intensely about the entrance of nine African-American students into their all white
school. Even one student, i.e., James Meredith integrating into Ole Miss, provoked a similar intense
reaction. In both instances the aggregate costs required to satisfy white preferences would have
dwarfed the aggregate resources of the African-Americans involved, probably even of their entire
community.
52. See Donohue, Advocacy Versus Analysis, supra note 40, at 1588 n.2I ("The problem in this
context is that any effort by blacks to bribe whites to stop discriminating may generate psychological
losses that exceed the gains from eliminating discrimination. In other words, the very act of trying to
bribe someone to treat you equally underscores your own subordinate role.... Some things of value
may simply not be achievable through purchase.").
53. In the grand sweep of American history, this failure of empathy is hardly noteworthy;
slaveholders imagined slaves were happy; and modem segregationists believed that only interference
from outside agitators generated civil rights protests from an otherwise contented (but impoverished
and exploited) African-American population. Of course slaveholders and segregationists were also
unabashedly white supremacists whose racial ideology had no problem conceptualizing African-
Americans as lacking any desire for personal freedom, autonomy or respect, factors central to the
existence of the white population and the foundational theory of our Constitution.
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having to pay greater wages to white workers so they would forego their
taste for discrimination. In the first instance blacks are never hired, so
black psychic costs do not become part of the cost structure of the
individual firm under analysis. In the second scenario, when white
employers must forego their preference for nonassociation because black
workers are hired, then black workers would have no psychic losses from
refusals to hire (although they would have psychic costs from the
knowledge that whites were paid more for the same work), but these
would not be firm costs. 4 Within the universe of the individual firm
under analysis, black psychic costs do not appear, so perhaps Becker
never thought of them. Proponents of Law and Economics then took his
finding that discriminatory firms would be less competitive, and
concluded that antidiscrimination laws were unnecessary and a dead
weight burden on the economy.5 But, this conclusion ignored the
underlying assumptions of Becker's analysis, which was limited to the
individual firm. The expansion of his finding from the individual firm
level to the general economy and society ignored the psychic costs to
victims of discrimination, who became invisible because their psychic
costs were external to any individual discriminating firm.
Unfortunately, I can offer no convincing explanations for the
decades long persistence of this oversight and my speculation would be
no more than that. The identification, description, and analysis of this
failure of Law and Economics bespeaks caution to those who would fit
complex human behavior within an all encompassing theory while
ignoring the limits and frailties of the human animal. 6
INCORPORATING BLACK PSYCHIC Loss IN BECKER'S MODEL
What happens to Becker's analysis if the psychic costs of victims of
racial discrimination are included? Black workers must incur psychic
costs," and, arguably, much greater psychic costs than whites, 8 resulting
54. This assumes that white employees and employers do not discriminate in other ways; e.g.,
terms and conditions of employment, assignments, training, promotions.
55. Becker's work preceded the enactment of Title VII by a decade, so this error cannot be laid at
his doorstep.
56. A brain biologist, finding this unremarkable, would point out that the brain evolved in
response to environmental challenges to the human animal's survival and not with the goal of
perfecting a general purpose reasoning appliance, the equivalent of a biological computer. See
generally JOSEPH E. LEDoux, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL
LIFE (1996). On how the biological basis of economic choices at the level of neural circuits in
individual brains has given rise to a new field neuroeconomics, see Sandra Blakslee, Brain Experts
Now Follow the Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at FI. There is even a legal variant, Law and
Neuroeconomics. See generally Terrence R. Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics, GEO. MASON L.
& ECON. RES. PAPER No. 04-07 (Feb. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=50I63.
57. These are aside from economic costs, e.g., exclusion from the informal information exchange
among co-workers that enhances job performance and career planning. In addition, preliminary
research suggests a link between the psychological stress of discrimination and hypertension and
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from explicit discriminatory denials of employment, disparate wages,59
racial harassment,6° overt bigotry, and deliberate acts of humiliation from
white employers and employees.
In the standard Law and Economics analysis, black workers must
work for lower wages because the reduction in demand for black workers
created by discriminatory employers would reduce the total demand for
black workers. With the supply remaining constant,62 their wages would
have to fall. Classic Law and Economics assumed black workers would
accept a discriminatory wage, and receive unequal pay for equal work
from employers concerned more with profits than a preference for
nonassociation.
If Becker's analysis is modified to incorporate black psychic costs,
then two major consequences ensue. The first is that the entire economy
benefits from the legal prohibitions of Title VII against discrimination.
The costs to victims of discrimination (to the extent that prohibition is
effective) are eliminated and civil rights laws are not wasteful. Second,
absent laws against discrimination, black workers might respond
differently than predicted by Law and Economics. They might not go and
happily work at other firms for lower wages. Subtracting their psychic
losses from their nominal wages could conceivably reduce their wages
below zero. Other alternatives might provide greater utility. They might
increased morbidity and mortality. Such a link, if confirmed, translates psychic costs into more
traditional economic costs. If debilitating stress is also created for whites merely from functioning in a
desegregated environment, then whites who experience this loss (of status according to the McAdams
critique), may also experience the psychic costs of being unable to satisfy their preference as the more
conventional economic loss of impaired health.
58. See supra note 40.
59. Denials of employment would result from white employer's preference for nonassociation.
6o. Racial harassment could result from employment of black workers by discriminatory
employers expressing their preference for nonassociation or from white employees expressing a similar
preference. Becker assumed perfect competition and the absence of supply constraints for workers of
either race, and he argued that white employers would trade their preference for nonassociation for
increased profits and employ all black employees at reduced wages, and that such an integrated work
force would not occur because white workers would demand more wages to work alongside black
workers than to work with other white workers, leading employers to have either all black or all white
employees. BECKER, supra note 1, at 56. In a less than perfect world with supply constraints for some
workers, employers may find a shortage of one category of white production workers, leading them to
hire all black employees in a given category, but there may be an oversupply of white supervisory
employees so that white supervising employees may be unable to move to a comparable position
supervising white employees. For such a white supervisory employee the quantification of his
preference for nonassociation would result in a sum less than the wage differential between
supervising black employees and stepping down to a lower category of employment where the
shortage exists.
6i. Legal prohibitions are often effective because they establish societal norms, but societal
norms favoring antidiscrimination might also exist in the absence of legal prohibitions.
62. This is a reasonable assumption for the short term, but over any extended period of time, the
labor supply might change, through migration, emigration, self-employment, or withdrawal from the
labor force.
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drop out of the labor force entirely, seek underground employment in
illegal activity, or seek employment in different occupations
(underemployment) with lower nominal wages but without the psychic
losses." Or they might become tardy and less disciplined at work. By
shirking they might lower their productivity to conform to their reduced
wage.6' By thus reducing psychic losses, shirking is income maximizing.
Since their reduced wages would in turn reduce their returns on their
invested human capital, they might have reduced incentives to make
future investments in their own human capital6" and become less willing
to increase their skills by seeking out training opportunities or advanced
education or become less willing to use informal networking
opportunities to benefit their employer. Each of these possible responses
denies to the less discriminatory employer the enhanced profitability that
Law and Economics predicts. For these reasons66 market competition is
unlikely to drive discriminatory firms out of business.
II. A Suspicious AUDIENCE
Overcoming the racial divides that plague our society requires the
creation of business wealth among all disadvantaged groups. Yet before
such a goal becomes the priority of the civil rights establishment, the
suspicions of this audience must first be overcome. This audience is far
from predisposed to consider solutions derived from economic analyses
of racial phenomena, or to view business firms as the natural
beneficiaries of their labors. Black business development has always
been an afterthought, or at best a step-child, in the civil rights agenda.
Most political support for such programs has come from Republican
administrations, not the Democrats, who, beginning with Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, and especially since Lyndon Baines Johnson, have
been viewed as more progressive on racial issues. And, African-
Americans are overwhelmingly Democratic. The Nixon administration's
heraldry of "Black Capitalism"' always seemed morally suspect when
contrasted with the War on Poverty. Robber barons, even black and
63. This means discrimination can affect the distribution of workers, which contradicts Becker's
analysis. See BECKER, supra note I, at 3.
64. A Soviet Russian aphorism captured the low worker productivity response to the low wages
of that society, "They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work."
65. CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 157-58 (997). This is also a response to
statistical discrimination and is the response that can make statistical discrimination a self-fulfilling
prophecy. See also Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and
Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787,825-828 (995) [hereinafter Swire, Persistent Problem].
66. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 65. Cass Sunstein and others have identified this
disincentive to invest in human capital in rebutting the claim that statistical discrimination is efficient.
67. Shortly after his election, President Richard Nixon established a national program for
minority business, in an effort to foster "Black Capitalism," Exec. Order No. 11,458, 3 C.F.R. § 779
(1969), which created the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) in the Department of
Commerce.
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embryonic ones, hardly seem deserving of our sympathy or sacrifice.
The personal history of the civil rights leadership created a fertile
milieu for suspicions about the business world and the credibility of
economic analysis. The civil rights establishment has historically lacked
significant ties to the business world. It is alien. None of the national
leaders of the 195os and i96os came from business backgrounds. Few
African-Americans have achieved positions of leadership within large• 68
corporations. Those that have, only recently, did not succeed by
pursuing African-American agendas. African-American owned business
firms more firmly grounded in African-American communities remain
small and a minor element in African-American society. 69 Some might
also doubt the wisdom of premising the fulfillment of the aspirations of
so many on the success of a small group motivated primarily by naked
self interest.
Another difficulty derives from the origins of African-American
intellectual opinion, which habitually views the world from a non-market
perspective. African-American history involves a unique experience with
the market. African-Americans were both exchanged as market
commodities"0 (a simultaneously harsh and intimate market experience)
68. The first African-American CEO of a Fortune 500 company was Franklin Raines, who was
first appointed in January 1999 as CEO of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).
Lynn Norment, New Faces in Executive Suites, EBONY, Jan. 2000, at 42-43. By 2002, Kenneth Chenault
at American Express, Richard Parsons at AOL-Time Warner, and Lloyd Ward at Maytag Corp. had
also been appointed as CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. Cora Daniels, The Most Powerful Black
Executives in America. Meet 5o Black Businessmen and Women Who Wield Unprecedented Clout,
FORTUNE, July 22, 2002, at 6o, 64-66. Since then, two more have joined their ranks. Stanley O'Neal
became CEO of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. at the end of 2002, available at
http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695 8134_8302_13747 and Aylwin Lewis was appointed CEO of
Sears Holdings Corp. in 2005, Robert Berner, At Sears, a Great Communicator, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct.
31, 2005, at 50, 52.
69. See Part III infra, for an analysis of the size of this business community. What market power
African-Americans possess is exercised as consumers, and consumers attempting to act collectively
face problems of free riding, bonding, communication, and governance-problems people usually
solve by forming governments.
70. Few recognize today the enormous share of national wealth held in slaves. The 186o Census
found total real and personal property of $16.2 billion. UNITED STATES, STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN 186o, at 295 tbl.2 (1866). The capital cost of all slaves in i86o was calculated as $2.7 billion.
Claudia Dale Goldin, The Economics of Emancipation, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 66, 73-74 (973). Therefore,
in 186o slaves represented about 17% of all the real and personal property within the U.S. The 186o
Census found 3,953,76o slaves representing 89% of the "Negro" population. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO
1957, Series A, 95-122 (I960). Another study calculated capital in slaves at about $I billion more or
23% of all real and personal property in the U.S. Louis A. Rose, Capital Losses of Southern
Slaveholders Due to Emancipation, W. ECON. J., Fall 1964, at 39, 40-41. Several states lost more than
5o percent of all property with emancipation. Id. at 51 tbl.9. Wealth in slaves freed probably exceeded
the South's share of GNP. Id. at 42. Wealth in slaves represented about the same share of national
wealth today represented by corporate equities and mutual fund shares combined or by total pension
fund reserves. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2004-2005,
at 458 tbl.695, Household and Non Profit Organizations Sector Balance Sheet: 1980-2003.
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and prohibited from engaging in market activity for their own benefit.7'
As a result, African-Americans lack a significant business community
and have only just begun to develop one.72
The absence of a strong business community and the indirect
prohibitions on developing one had two consequences. It led to an early
reliance on non-market institutions, especially the church, but also
including schools and social welfare organizations, both as sources of
leadership and as intermediaries to engage dominant white institutions.
It also distorted the African-American perspective on society and social
change by underemphasizing the roles of business and entrepreneurial
activity. Further skewing this perspective, major non-market institutions
such as the military, government, and nonprofit social welfare
organizations tentatively began employing African-Americans more than
a generation before the business community, assuring that the African-
Americans most knowledgeable about mainstream institutions remained
somewhat removed from the business world. Even during the period of
sustained organizational activity that created political coalitions capable
of enacting civil rights legislation, only rarely did political allies come
from the white business community.
Until comparatively recently, few African-Americans had direct
experience as business owners.73 Even professional employment in major
71. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH
316-40 (I974) (describing laws that discriminated against blacks in the early I9th century); LORENZO
JOHNSON GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 298-315 (1968) (describing political,
economic, and social barriers imposed on free blacks in New England during the 18 'h century); A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE
COLONIAL PERIOD (I978) (chronicling various state legal and economic barriers faced by slaves); LEON
F. LrrWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-I860 153-86 (i961) (describing
how discriminatory laws and attitudes kept blacks of the North out of commerce, the professions, and
skilled occupations); EDGAR J. MCMANUS, BLACK BONDAGE IN THE NORTH 172-77 (1973) (explaining
how post emancipation laws perpetuated the white hegemony); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d ed. 1966) (detailing segregation known as the Jim Crow system); Flournoy A.
Coles, Jr., The Unique Problems of the Black Businessman, 26 VAND. L. REV. 509, 510-I1 (973)
(describing several s8th century laws preventing slaves from carrying on businesses).
72. See Part III, infra.
73. In 1982, of the 339,239 Black-owned business firms, only 38,631 were substantial enough to
have paid employees, only 1,129 had receipts exceeding $i,ooo,ooo; and only 136 employed too or
more employees. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES-BLACK, at 4 tbl.I, 9o tbl.9, 92 tbl.io (1985). By 1997, Black-owned firms had
grown in number to 823,499 with 93,235 having paid employees, an increase of 243% in the number of
firms and an increase of 241% in the number of those with paid employees. Firms with $i,ooo,ooo or
more in receipts had increased to 8,682, [Since this threshold is unadjusted for inflation, the increase in
part reflects this factor.] and firms with ioo or more employees had grown by 654%. Even with this
rapid growth Black-owned firms accounted for only 3.95% of all firms, 1.76% of firms with paid
employees, and 0.38 % of total business receipts. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE. 1997
SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES - BLACK, at 17 tbl.i, 75 tbl.8, 77 tbl.9, 8o tbl.II
(2OO). Preliminary estimates released from the most recent economic census (2002) show continued
growth. Between 1997 and 2002 the number of Black-owned firms increased 45%, and their revenues
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corporations, itself effectively barred until the late i96os, could not
provide a rewarding experience with market institutions. An economic
perspective on society, routine for any business owner, did not come
bundled with the African-American experience. Amongst neither the
elites nor the rank and file would reliance on business as an engine of
collective progress have come naturally.
At the same time that Law and Economics became popular among
legal academics in the early 197os, African-Americans first began the
desegregation of mainstream legal institutions, especially the law
schools.74 Many of the first law faculty had first established themselves as
lawyers with major civil rights organizations and had spent considerable
portions of their careers battling discrimination. To them the sincere
belief that civil rights laws were unnecessary and that market forces
would extinguish discrimination would have seemed akin to lunacy.
During this period, the Olin Foundation was both funding the
establishment of Law and Economics programs at a number of leading
law schools7" and providing financial support to many of the litigation
efforts seeking to invalidate affirmative action.76 This common source of
support suggested a link between a dominant school of economics and a
broader agenda hostile to civil rights.
Furthermore, Becker's analysis, which hypothesized racial
discrimination motivated by a desire for nonassociation, flatly
contradicted the historical record. In the South especially, during slavery
and its Jim Crow aftermath, the most intimate functions of white family
life revolved around African-Americans as domestic servants, nannies,
increased 30%, but the number with paid employees increased from 93,200 to 94,862, less than 1.7%.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS, PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF BUSINESS
OWNERSHIP BY GENDER, HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN, AND RACE: 2002, available at
http://www.census.gov/csd/sbo/ and http:/lwww.census.govlPress-Releaselwww2001/cboI-54.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2005).
74. The first African-American to teach full time at a predominantly white law school, was
Willam R. Ming, who taught at the University of Chicago's law school from 1946-I95o . By 1964 the
national total had reached four and by I973 the total of full time teachers at ABA accredited schools
had reached about fifty. Edward J. Littlejohn, Black Law Professors: A Past... A Future?, MICH. B.J.
538, 540 (1985). Even earlier, Clarence M. Maloney, "spent 'a review year at... Buffalo School of
Law' in 1925, J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION, THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944, at 41
(993).
75. The Olin Foundation has supported Law and Economics programs at leading law schools,
including Harvard University, University of Michigan, Stanford University, University of Chicago,
University of Virginia, University, of California-Berkeley, Northwestern University, Cornell
University, and Georgetown University. See John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants,
available at http://www.jmof.org/grants-1996.html (last visited July 16, 2004).
76. From 1985-2o00, Olin gave the Pacific Legal Foundation $545,ooo. LEE COKORINOS, THE
ASSAULT ON DIVERSITY: AN ORGANIZED CHALLENGE TO RACIAL AND GENDER JUSTICE 94 (2003).
"Beginning with its involvement in the seminal 1978 case, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, Pacific Legal Foundation has been in the forefront of anti-affirmative action litigation
throughout the entire country." Id. at 89.
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and wet nurses. Even housing patterns reflected this intimacy. Before
modern forms of transportation developed and became widely available
to the poor, the large number of African-Americans who worked in
white households necessarily lived in close proximity to their employers.
At the time Becker wrote (1957), the South lacked the strict geographic
residential segregation that marked the urban North, a state of affairs
taken as a given by Becker. 7 Even in the urban North, the scale of such
segregation was of comparatively recent origins, reflecting the migrations
fueled by the industrial expansions of two World Wars. To anyone with a
passing acquaintance with African-American or urban history, Becker's
hypothesis appeared absurd.
Law and Economics only compounded this absurdity when it
pronounced that antidiscrimination laws were unnecessary and wasteful.
In the context of the times, the policy recommendations coming from
Law and Economics appeared dubious at best, and coming so soon after
the first beginnings of desegregation, possibly malign. For later scholars,
especially economists who rejected the assumptions underlying Law and
Economics, and who might have investigated whether economic analysis
could shed new light on racial phenomena, the well had been poisoned.
Even without this "poison" the civil rights community was unlikely
to be fertile ground for economic analysis. It had never succumbed to the
infatuation with economic analysis and market efficiency that captivated
the imagination of so many conservatives. Relatively few senior legal
scholars identified with the civil rights community, or sympathetic to it,
have used economic analysis as part of their core scholarship 8 A few
77. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 5, at 19-22. "Before i9oo, blacks were not particularly
segregated from whites, and although they were overrepresented in the poorest housing and the
meanest streets, their residential status did not differ markedly from that of others in the same
economic circumstances." Id. at 19. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE
NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 279-303 (2oth Anniv. ed., 1962). Until the spread of
motorized public transportation, commuting was not possible. I am hardly to first to point this out. See
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 36, at 1037 (Discussing the theory that some
individuals will make material sacrifices for group welfare and will do so for intangible rewards like
honor or enhanced esteem. Furthermore, it discusses how employment of African-American help in
southern homes rebuts the "desire to avoid contact with blacks."). McAdams analysis has been
rejected by adherents to Law and Economics. See Epstein, Status-Production, supra note 37. The real
problem with McAdams' critique, which I otherwise find persuasive, is that the racial status
production that he identifies requires a group identity, and microeconomics assumes that the
individual is the only relevant unit of analysis, i.e., that groups do not matter. Thus his theory violates
a fundamental assumption of his critiques. It is unfortunate that such conflicts in assumptions are
rarely articulated and that economic analysis proceeds without first making all assumptions explicit.
78. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating
Discrimination A Blind Alley?, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 215 (8998):
Beginning with Gary Becker's ground-breaking work in 1957, law and economics had come
to dominate discussion in many areas that I, at least, felt were ill-suited to that form of
analysis. Like most humanists, I found something disturbing about applying cost-benefit
treatment to phenomena such as human emotions. In particular, I was perturbed by how
easily so many accepted that economic analysis could explain the mysteries of human
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specialists in employment discrimination are the categorical exception.79
Those sympathizers who have incorporated economic approaches most
systematically into their work have been concerned with broader
research agendas and the application to racial discrimination has been
just a feature or phase of their work." The major focus of the civil rights
community, both within and without legal academe, has remained
antidiscrimination and equality jurisprudence. This community has also
had little exposure to the competing schools of economics that provide
alternative approaches to those of Law and Economics, and whose
theories are more in accord with the lived experience of racial
discrimination. This situation is slowly changing. A growing number of
younger scholars have incorporated economics into their work without
wholesale acceptance of the assumptions underlying Law and
Economics."
Even fewer scholars (from any discipline) have focused on the
barriers confronted by minority business owners. A small body of
academic legal literature has developed around the issues faced by lower
income communities seeking economic development, and constitutional
scholars have examined affirmative action in the context of minority
business development, most notably the constitutionality of minority
business set-asides. Still, racial barriers faced by minority owned business
firms, whether arising from contemporary discrimination or resulting
from the legacy of past discrimination, have not been the subject of much
interest. Minority entrepreneurs, the immediate beneficiaries of minority
business programs and already comfortably middle class, might not
inspire sufficient concern. Further, the roots of civil rights activism lie in
nature.
Id. at 218. One singal exception to this lack of interest in economic analysis of discrimination outside
the employment context is Ian Ayres, who has also produced empirical as well as theoretical analyses.
See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, lO4 HARV. L.
REV. 817 (199) [hereinafter Ayres, Fair Driving]; Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in
New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres,
Further Evidence]. See also Swire, Persistent Problem, supra note 65; Peter P. Swire, Equality of
Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533 (1995). Swire applies
economic analysis to resolve the dispute between economists skeptical of the survival of lending
discrimination in competitive markets and those who document its persistence through empirical
research. He finds at least four theoretical economic accounts for why competitive markets may not
stop lending discrimination. Both Ayres and Swire have moved on to other research agendas.
79. See generally John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics:
Employment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709 (1993); John J.
Donohue III, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 903, 911-18 (1988).
8o. See, e.g., McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 36; McAdams, Relative Preferences,
supra note 37; Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637, 2638 (1998);
Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 78; Ayres, Further Evidence, supra note 78; Ian Ayres, Alternative
Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Market Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67 (1994).
81. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 3 (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002)).
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social welfare reform and the church. Neither would find a vision of
legions of ambitious and well educated minority entrepreneurs becoming
extravagantly rich (and voting accordingly) an appealing inducement for
self-sacrifice. Given the competing claims on the resources and attention
of public interest activists, family dysfunction, inadequate health care
and education, high rates of incarceration and unemployment, among
many other issues, minority business might not seem to warrant high
priority. Yet until minorities have prosperous business communities,
filled with financially successful Babbits82 who their writers can satirize,
true equality will remain a mirage.
While such a claim might appear self evident, the significance of
minority business wealth is often overlooked. Besides dramatically
increasing the public and private resources available to address our
society's failings, it also provides access for minorities to the
nongovernmental corridors of power. The pursuit of business wealth is
not some version of "trickle down" economics.8' The economic
consequences of achieving business parity equate not to a few raindrops
but to a torrential downpour.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS WEALTH
To be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in the land of
dollars is the very bottom of hardships.
84
The Founding Fathers placed considerable faith in the institution of
private property as the foundation of liberty.85 African-American leaders
in the early twentieth century recognized this too. Both Booker T.
Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois sought to foster business ownership.
86
Neither foresaw that the ultimate success of their efforts to desegregate
American society would as a byproduct destroy the then existing
82. SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBIT (Bantam Classics 1998) (1922).
83. "One economist defines it as 'A theory of economic development that claims higher standards
of living for the poor will develop gradually [with economic growth] and not at the overt expense of
the more affluent."' WIKIPEDnA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wikifrrickle-down_economics (last visited
Nov. I 1, 2005).
84. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 20 (Fawcett Publ'ns 1961) (19o7).
85. "Property must be secured, or liberty cannot exist." JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (2d ed. 1998) (quoting JOHN
ADAMS, Discourses on Davila, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 223, 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,
1851); THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison). "The framers of the Constitution were men to whom
the right to hold property was enormously important .... Property was seen not as opposed to liberty,
but indispensable to it; for men with property would be independent of the power of the State ......
David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 421,
426 (1983).
86. Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 41 o -12 (2001). The two leaders
collaborated in the formation of the National Negro Business League. Mark Bauerlein, Washington,
Du Bois, and the Black Future, WILSON QUARTERLY, Autumn 2o04, http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?
fuseaction=wq.print&essay-id=96415&stoplayout=true.
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African-American business community."7 The desegregation of public
accommodations in 1964 caused a sudden collapse of the racial trade
barriers in public accommodations. 8 It exposed the tiny cadre of African-
American business firms, accustomed to operating personal service and
retail trade firms sheltered by rigid segregation from competition with
the white mainstream, to an onslaught of competition for their most
affluent customers from far larger mainstream firms, with national
brands, more convenient locations, economies of scale, better
technology, and much deeper pockets. Rapid decline ensued8s
Few of these firms, established to exploit and nurtured by segregated
markets, have survived and prospered. Instead, African-American firms
equipped to thrive and grow in a desegregated marketplace have tended
to be new ventures, established by a new class of entrepreneurs. They
lack not only established business networks, and often working capital
and experience, but they also lack any legal protection from racial
discrimination in a society where race still matters. Yet over the past
several decades this new group, most of which is in wholesale trade or
business services, economic sectors where previously black-owned firms
were extremely rare, has grown much faster than the overall economy.
Until recently the decline of traditional firms, previously supported by
segregated markets in retail trade and personal services, had obscured
their growth. Despite rapid growth, because they start from such a small
base these newer firms have not yet become a significant factor in the
economy.
Yet, without the existence of a successful business community,
existing on a continuum in size and sophistication from Wall Street to
Main Street, how can anyone claim the playing field has been leveled?
Substantive racial equality requires a rough parity of resources in all the
arenas of power, including the media, the military, government, politics,
academe, and particularly business, the source of the privately controlled
wealth essential to influence in most of the other venues.
Between 197o and 199o median black household incomes hovered
near 6o% of median white household incomes.' During the decade of
87. Timothy Bates, Urban Economic Transformation and Minority Business Opportunities, 13
REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 21, 28-32. The African-American business firms provided goods and services
to African-American consumers that whites would not provide because the provision would have
contradicted the racial status hierarchy imposed by segregation and the reigning ideology of white
supremacy. See generally TIMOTHY BATES, RACE, SELF EMPLOYMENT AND UPWARD MOBILITY (1997).
88. Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2oooa-2oooh (1988)).
89. Bates, supra note 87, at 28-32; Robert E. Suggs, Recent Changes in Black-Owned Business 25-
26 (Joint Center for Political Studies, Working Paper, 1986).
90. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2OOI, at 443
tbls.661 & 662 [hereinafter STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2001]. The ratios computed from tabular data
were: 197o-6o.9%; i98o-57.6%; 1985-59.5%; 199o-59.8%; 1995-62.6%. This data set understates the
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the 1990s prosperity brought a small but steady rise to 65.7% by I999,'
but it dropped to 64.4% by 2002," the most recent year for which data is
available. To achieve parity, black household incomes must increase by
more than one-half. Large as that gap is, however, the disparity in wealth
dwarfs this disparity in incomes. The wealth (median net worth) of white
households exceeds that of black households by five to ten times.93 At
higher levels of wealth, the disparity only increases. Four percent of
white households have net worths exceeding $5oo,ooo, twenty times
more than the respective percent of Black households (o.2%); 9 and
because high wealth households are greatly undercounted, this census
data understates the disparity.95
Business participation rates reflect the same magnitude of disparity
as wealth data. Of all the major minority groups in American society,
African-Americans have the lowest business participation rate, engaging
in self-employment at between one-quarter to one-third the frequency of
size of the true disparity for at least two reasons; the data on money incomes of households excludes
capital gains, id. at 414-15, of which the wealthy tend to receive a disproportionately large share, and
because (given current income distributions) the medians underweight the impact of the extremely
wealthy; and blacks are underrepresented among the wealthy. Arthur B. Kennickell, A Rolling Tide:
Changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the U.S., 1989-2oo 34 (Levy Economics Institute, Working
Paper No. 393, 2003) (showing that in 2001 the share of non-Hispanic white families with wealth
exceeding $500,oo was 7.6 times that of African-American families).
91. STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2001, at 443 tbls.661 & 662; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2002, at 436 tbls.657 & 658 (Including data from
2000, the median income level of African-American households achieved 64.2% of that of the median
income level of white households by 2000.).
92. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2004-2005, at
443 tbl.665.
93. Michael E. Davern & Patricia J. Fisher, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP: 1995, THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION, at 2 tbl.I (995) [hereinafter NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP: 1995] ($49,030 to
$7,073 or seven times); T.J. Eller & Wallace Fraser, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS: 1993, at 9 tbl.F (993) [hereinafter ASSET OWNERSHIP OF
HOUSEHOLDS: 1993] ($45,740 to $4,418 or ten times in 1993 and $47,o75 to $4,844 or ten times in I991
(in 1993 dollars)); Arthur B. Kennickell, et al., RECENT CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES: RESULTS
FROM THE 1998 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, FED. RESERVE BULL., at 7 tbl-3 (200o), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2ooo/ooindex.htm (comparing the family net worth of
White non-Hispanics to non-White or Hispanic, 1989, 90.5/8.5; 1992, 79.5/13.7; 1995, 81.2/16.8; 1998,
94.9/16.4 in thousands of 1998 dollars).
94. NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP: 1995, supra note 93, at 7 tbl.4 . Mean net worth shows
lesser multiples but much greater absolute magnitudes. Median wealth survey data is considered less
skewed by the few observations for high income households. The Census survey found only forty-four
percent of the aggregate wealth measured by the Federal Reserve survey. ASSET OWNERSHIP OF
HOUSEHOLDS: 1993, supra note 93, at 2. Only at death is there an obligation to report total wealth to
governments for purposes of state and federal estate taxes. In the interim, many assets virtually unique
to the wealthy, e.g., jewelry, antiques, art collections, etc. appreciate over time and except for purposes
of insurance or divorce are never reappraised for their fair market value. Even the appreciation of real
estate and securities is unrecognized until these assets are sold.
95. The U.S. Census Bureau survey found only forty-four percent of the aggregate wealth
measured by the Federal Reserve survey. ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS: 1993, supra note 93, at 2.
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the overall population. 6 This rate has barely changed in the seventeen
years between the 198o decennial census and the 1997 Survey of
Minority-Owned Business Enterprises.97 The selection of majors by
African-American college students indicates a growing interest in
business, but this indication does not differentiate between those seeking
jobs with business firms and those planning to become entrepreneurs."
Nonetheless, recent data reveal a significant emerging trend of successful
entrepreneurship.
The Census Bureau's Survey of Minority-Owned Business
Enterprises (SMOBE) contains the most comprehensive data base for
minority business activity. In the ten year interval from 1972 (the first
year in which a full census was conducted) to 1982, the number of paid
employees99 with Black-owned firms increased by less than 13%." In
96. Frank A. Fratoe & Ronald L. Meeks, MINORITY Bus. DEV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUSINESS PARTICIPATION RATES OF THE FIFTY LARGEST U.S. ANCESTRY GROUPS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 4, 6
(June 1985). The national business participation rate of 48.9 self-employed persons per looo was
nearly four times the sub-Saharan African rate of 13.6. MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STATE OF MINORITY BUSINESS, 1997 SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (SMOBE), at i1 tbl.9 (rev. Sept. 5, 2001) [hereinafter STATE OF MINORITY
BUSINESS, 1997.] This study found a national business participation rate of seventy-eight, a non-
minority rate of ninety-one, and an African-American rate of twenty-four.
97. STATE OF MINORITY BUSINESS, 1997, supra note 96, at II tbl.9.
98. Between 1981 and 199o the annual number of African-Americans earning bachelor of
business degrees increased from around 13,ooo to 15,5oo, and the number earning master of business
degrees increased from about 2,400 to 3,300. Vital Signs: The Statistics That Describe the Present and
Suggest the Future of African Americans in Higher Education, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., 29, 37
(Winter 1993-1994).
99. Paid employment best captures the growth of these firms because the usual measure,
revenues, requires continual adjustment for inflation. Employment also shows the effects of business
activity on employees, a much larger group than the number of business owners. Everything else being
equal, minority firms tend to have greater proportions of minority employees than non-minority firms,
but the racial composition of these employees is not the focus of this analysis. African-American
business owners who employ large numbers of nonminorities may have more cultural significance for
our society than those whose labor force is largely minority.
loo. Growth in numbers of employees:
1972-147,184
1977- 164,177
1982 -165,765 (Restated as 121,373 in 1987 census publication to conform to then
current criteria, which excluded all corporations except subchapter S
firms.)
1987 -220,467
1992-345,193
1997-718,341 (Survey criteria revised to include all corporations including C
corporations. Excluding all corporations but S corporations, the total
would have been 378,346. See tbl.7.)
2002-770,746
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,
1972: BLACK, tbl.1 (1972); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF MINORITY-
OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 1982: BLACK, tbl.I (1985); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 1987; BLACK, tbl.i (199o); U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 1992:
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contrast, during the fifteen years between 1982 and 1997, paid
employment with Black-owned firms expanded by 333%. 'o In the next
five years, which includes the bursting of the internet bubble,
employment at Black-owned firms increased only 7.3% (1997-2002)
virtually the same total gain as for the entire economy (7.2%). °" While
such rapid growth provides grounds for optimism about the future,
unless this trend continues unbroken for decades, celebration would be
premature. (In addition, some of this growth may be an artifact of the
survey methodology used.)'" At present, African-Americans comprise
twelve percent of the population, but employment with African-
American owned firms still constitutes less than one percent of all
employment by U.S. firms. 4
Data on gross business receipts reveal the same picture. Less than
half of one percent of all business receipts derive from Black-owned
firms. 5 While miniscule, this share has doubled since 1982.'0, If this rapid
BLACK, at 9 tbl.i (1996); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 1997: BLACK, at 17, 74 tbls.I & 7 (2ooi). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 2002 SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS, PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BY
GENDER, HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN AND RACE: 2002, available at http://www.census.gov/csd/sbo/
sector/secoo.htm.
101. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS: SURVEY OF
MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, BLACK 9 (2O01) [hereinafter 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS: SURVEY
OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES] (The total in 1997 was 718,341.); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 ECONOMIC CENSUS: SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES, BLACK, at 4 tbl.i (1985) (The total in 1982 was 165,765).
102. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2002 SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS,
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BY GENDER, HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN AND RACE:
2002, available at http://www.census.gov/csd/sbo/sector/secoo.HTM.
103. The Census Bureau has struggled to accurately count C corporations, often the largest and
most sophisticated business ventures, because these corporations have no Social Security
Administration identifiers filed with their tax returns. Pass-through entities (sole proprietorships,
partnerships, limited liability companies, and subchapter S corporations), whose income is taxed
directly to owners, report social security numbers of owners, allowing racial identifiers in social
security records to identify minority-owned firms. In the census for the years 1987 and 1992 the survey
did not include C corporations. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF MINORITY-
OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 1987: Black at iv, vi (199o); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 1992: Black, at v, vii (1996).
104. Total employment in 1997 with U.S. firms was 103,359,815. 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS: SURVEY
OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, supra note iOi, at 80 tbl.II. While some business firms
are so large and old that their institutional character might argue against their having a racial character
to their ownership, even if we eliminate all firms with 500 or more employees, Black-Owned firms still
employ only 1.5% of the total. Id. at 92, tbl.I5 (Firms with 500 or more employees had 50,086,736
employees.). Firms without paid employees (those to which only owners or independent contractors
provide services), while far more numerous (Of 823,499 Black-Owned firms in 1997, only 93,235 had
paid employees. Id. at 17, tbl.i) than those with paid employees, comprising eighty-eight percent of all
Black-Owned firms, averaged gross receipts of only $20,317, which after subtracting expenses would
be far too little to support anyone. The vast majority of these firms without employees probably
represented part-time efforts ancillary to the owner's main source of income as an employee of some
other entity.
105. Id. at I7, 9o tbls.I & 14. The proportion of receipts from Black-Owned firms is 0.38%.
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growth rate, doubling market share every fifteen years, continues for
another seventy-five years, only then would this share of business
receipts reach the proportion of African-Americans in the total
population.
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BENEFITS OF A SIZEABLE BUSINESS SECTOR
In the world's largest and richest market economy, African-
Americans and other minorities' cannot participate as equals unless
they too can deploy the private power generated by the control and
ownership of substantial business assets. The ability to grant or deny
desirable jobs and contracts extends influence far beyond the boundaries
of particular business firms. Campaign contributions, offers of attractive
employment opportunities and profitable business transactions can serve
as currency to cement the implicit and explicit bargains that create
mechanisms of private social control and allow business communities to
influence and even dominate political leaders. Greater financial
resources would also enhance the ability to fund special interest lobbying
and extend political influence beyond turnout at the polling booths. Such
private power is often exercised beyond either the public scrutiny or
accountability demanded of public elected or appointed officials and it
can serve broader purposes than the "public purposes"' 8 to which
governments must dedicate their resources.
If African-American communities had a thriving private sector and
business class, their wealth would ameliorate many of the persistent
economic racial disparities in employment, income, and wealth. High and
increasing rates of incarceration plague low income African-American
communities. African-Americans without criminal records are viewed as
less desirable than whites with such records."° African-American ex-
offenders face nearly insurmountable barriers. Potential employers of
the same race might share sufficient personal networks of family and
friends that the private information available to them might allow them
to make more accurate judgments about rehabilitation and be more
willing to employ them. Fragmentary data suggests that "minority owned
firms are nearly twice as likely to accept ex-felons as are employers in
general, .... suggesting either that they have information about these
employees unavailable to other employers, or that they accept higher
degrees of risk of employee misbehavior.
1o6. Suggs, supra note 89, at 6.
IO7. The business activities of other minority groups show a wide dispersion. Asian-Americans,
despite large variations among their different groups, on average match the profile of nonminorities,
while Hispanics by most measures are about midway between nonminorities and African-Americans.
io8. See Wilson v. Conn. Prod. Dev. Corp., 355 A.2d 72 (Conn. 1974).
IO9. See infra note 124.
Iio. Margaret C. Simms, Ex-Felons Face Major Economic Obstacles, Focus, May-June 2004, at 7,
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A lack of private decision-making authority in most areas of the
economy even limits the influence that African-Americans have achieved
in the public sectors of politics and government. While political
commentators decry the influence of money on politics, a paucity of
financial resources to compete in money driven electoral campaigns
creates a serious disadvantage for black elected officials. Many must
negotiate the conflicting desires of a working class and low income
electorate, while simultaneously raising campaign funds from the
mainstream business community.
Increased African-American business ownership would increase
social cohesion and strengthen other intangible factors.' that help
political communities thrive. It would enable all groups to experience
each other in new roles. When African-American entrepreneurs interact
with other business owners as valued customers, suppliers, or sources of
financing, old stereotypes are challenged and new images are created.
Business networks are also social networks.
African-American ownership of media firms could, through
programming choices and news coverage decisions, expand the
boundaries of public discussion by drawing the public's attention to
critical issues. Increased wealth would sustain philanthropic and
charitable organizations, which could meet many social service and
cultural needs without having to rely on the political process or
subjecting itself to public sector constraints. Charities can pursue goals
chosen by a minority faction within a political community when it cannot
achieve sufficient consensus to become a majority and gain access to
public resources. More equal wealth would reduce the social significance
of segregated neighborhoods."2 De facto segregated schools become an
altogether different phenomenon when supported by a substantial tax
base and attended by students from families whose affluence assures the
advantages that resources provide. The persistence of discrimination may
prevent achievement of complete equality across all measurable
dimensions, but increased ownership of business assets would reduce
many disparities.
Given the improvements in legal, political, social and economic
status achieved by the antidiscrimination legal strategies of the civil
rights movement, further gains in business ownership will likely continue
even while levels of discrimination remain significant. Black business
activity has grown despite the legacy of past discrimination and current
racial barriers. Existing prohibitions against discrimination in
I I I. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 20-62 (1987).
112. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton found a high degree of residential segregation at all
income levels. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 5, at 83-88. This suggests that little segregation results
from average racial income differentials.
[VOL. 57:255
POISONING THE WELL
employment, public accommodations, housing, and education will have
desirable if indirect effects on business wealth. But rather than resting on
these achievements, we should seek to accelerate the scope and
sophistication of business activity. To do otherwise wastes enormous
amounts of human potential, and exposes American society to the risk
that intervening events might interrupt such improvements and
exacerbate our racial divisions. The private power exercised by business
owners and business firms is essentially economic power, and it
impoverishes any discussion of the acquisition and development of such
power to exclude or ignore the concepts, insights, and methods of the
many different schools of economic thought.
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RACIAL PHENOMENA
Equal protection doctrine no longer provides a useful lens through
which to examine race or remediate racial inequities in American
society. It once did. When laws classified and mandated by racial
categories and imposed burdens and recognized privileges to ensure
white supremacy, racially motivated decisions were clear and
unambiguous. The line drawing and formulaic approaches of equal
protection doctrine made sense. Yet today few explicit and
unambiguously malign racial classifications continue to operate. Race
with its evolving social and psychological facets has become a slippery,
nuanced concept."'3 Its effects are often opaque both to those affected by
and those making the decisions. It often influences decisions in murky
and amorphous ways, leaving no single motive standing out as obviously
determinative.
On occasion, economics has provided illuminating insights into racial
phenomena. One classic gem by Thomas Schelling,"4 an economist who
has written little else about racial phenomena, modeled the impact on
housing segregation if blacks and whites had different preferences for
degrees of integration for their neighborhoods, and each wished to avoid
being part of a small minority. The results are striking. His model shows
that even if both groups will accept significant levels of integration, the
only stable arrangement will be nearly complete segregation. One
counterintuitive implication of this analysis is that high degrees of
segregation do not necessarily reflect high levels of racial intolerance.
113. The debate over whether race is a valid scientific category has still not been resolved. See
Nicholas Wade, Two Scholarly Articles Diverge on Role of Race in Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2003, at A3o. At least the debate now seems cast in terms of whether race is a biologically meaningful
concept in the context of population groups. This is an improvement from the earlier controversy
when racial categories carried biological destiny for particular individuals. See also Jonathan Kahn,
How a Drug Becomes "Ethnic": Law, Commerce, and the Production of Racial Categories in Medicine,
4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics t (2004) (analyzing how patent claims and ethnic niche
marketing combined to revive claims of race as biologically based).
114. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 137-55 (1978).
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While this model was simple and could not incorporate many factors
affecting turnover in residential neighborhoods, it illustrated dynamics of
racial turnover and resegregation, fueled not by raw bigotry, but merely
a desire to avoid racial isolation.
The policy implications of Schelling's analysis are troubling for the
equal protection model of racial discrimination fueled by racial animus.
Eliminating racial discrimination by real estate intermediaries (sales
agents, mortgage brokers, insurers, etc.) from housing markets will not
automatically create stable integrated neighborhoods. Neither will the
resulting segregated neighborhoods reflect the aggregate desires of the
individuals involved. Instead, the results might please no one.
Unfortunately, changing the resulting patterns that might satisfy no one
requires the coordination of many individual decisions. Accomplishing
such coordination would typically involve race conscious governmental
actions or market interventions by private organizations, and these might
run afoul of current equality laws or antitrust prohibitions."5 The
essential benefit of such an analysis is to suggest that more than racial
animus fuels residential segregation.
In two other contexts blaming racial animus for racial discrimination
in real estate markets falls short as a complete explanation. Data on
residential segregation shows that it persists at high levels, for all income
groups, especially for African-Americans. Housing audits show that real
estate sales agents "steer" African-American and Hispanic buyers to
specific racially identifiable geographic areas even when these areas do
not meet their declared preferences. The standard analysis assumes that
racial bias among sales agents accounts for such practices. No doubt this
is true in some cases, but as an explanation it is inadequate because it
fails to answer a critical question.
Consider a major metropolitan region with a sizeable black middle-
class and a documented history of racial steering. Rather than litigate fair
housing claims in an attempt to reduce this practice, why is it not possible
to just obtain a real estate license, publicize the discriminatory steering
practices of one's competitors, announce one's own refusal to steer, and
then collect commissions from minority buyers seeking to avoid being
steered? Since no one pursues this business model, and there are plenty
of minority agents around (presumably some of whom are unbiased),
more than simple racial bias must account for the practice of steering.
Any agent, black or white, who wants to maintain a profitable business
must probably accommodate herself to steering, whatever their personal
115. See generally South Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868
(7th Cir. i99i); Mark W. Zimmerman, Note, Opening the Door to Race-Based Real Estate Marketing:
South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors, 41 DEPAUL L. Rsv.
1271 (1992).
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values. The market must somehow demand steering.
A similar anomaly exists in credit markets. The Community
Reinvestment Act attempts to obligate banks to lend in the
neighborhoods in which they locate offices. It seeks to prevent the
practice known as redlining, in which lenders refuse credit to minority
communities. Denials of credit can have a devastating impact, creating
perverse incentives for property owners to defer or eliminate
maintenance, and reducing wealth and general economic activity by
eliminating a primary source of collateral and capital appreciation. The
assumption underlying the Act is that banks or bank personnel refuse
credit because of prejudice. But redlining creates business opportunities
for other lenders if the markets that are starved have the potential to be
profitable. Minority owned community banks could be formed or could
expand to serve such markets. If they do not, then something about the
market either creates a barrier to their expansion or reduces profitability
below alternative opportunities. Without an accurate diagnosis, we
cannot fix the problem, we can only fail repeatedly at correcting the
wrong problem.
THE EFFECTS OF RACIALLY INFORMED DECISIONS
Microeconomics has developed a number of approaches to analyzing
racial discrimination. 6 Only two have received much attention from
legal academics. The first, developed by Gary Becker and discussed
previously, attributes motives for discrimination to a preference for
nonassociation. The second ascribes discrimination to a rational use of
racial stereotypes to avoid the increased information costs necessary to
acquire individualized information rather than to any malign motive.
Becker's preference model contradicts the historical record, but at least it
allows the potential irrational element of prejudice to fuel discrimination
because the sources of preferences are outside the model. The concept of
statistical discrimination, with its emphasis on rational stereotypes,
denies that centuries of the well documented ideology of white
supremacy used until the contemporary era to justify slavery and Jim
Crow had any information effects.'' 7
I16. For a summary of the many economic perspectives on racial discrimination, see ECONOMICS
AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 37, at xxvii-xxxii (a two volume collection of reprinted articles on this
general topic). In the introduction, Darity summarizes and briefly critiques some of the alternative
economic motives for discrimination developed by economists.
I17. Contemporary accounts overlook the prevalence of white supremacy doctrines in elite circles:
In a response to the Brown v. Board of Education decision ordering the nation's public
schools desegregated, William F. Buckley Jr.'s guidebook to conservative thought, National
Review, declared the following in the summer of 1957: 'The central question that emerges-
and it is not a parliamentary question or a question that is answered by merely consulting a
catalogue of rights of American citizens, born Equal-is whether the White community in
the South is entitled to take such measures as are necessary to prevail, politically and
culturally, in areas where it does not predominate numerically? The sobering answer is
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As a concept, statistical discrimination implicitly assumes that
enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act caused an instantaneous and
complete change of heart in the white population, even among those who
opposed its enactment most vehemently. It ignores what we know about
both the human personality and a culture's resistance to change,"8 and
even our cognitive function." 9
A more plausible analytical model for discrimination would
recognize that while stereotypes may incorporate generalizations with
varying degrees of accuracy, race also projects irrational elements into
decisions. Race is information, but its use as information is often far from
perfectly rational. Race can corrupt decisions in a number of ways that
might lead to systematic errors.
First, statistical discrimination claims to describe a rational
phenomenon because its racial stereotypes substitute for more
individualized information that is either unavailable or more costly to
obtain."'2 The more psychologically plausible claim is that the presence of
race in the information mix leads to systematic pessimistic errors in
estimates of both the degree of availability and the acquisition cost of
more individualized information.'2 ' Second, information about racial
Yes-the White community is so entitled because, for the time being, it is the advanced
race....'
Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Recalling An Ugly Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at At7.
II8. It also incorporates the consequences of prior discrimination as its justification for continuing
"rational" discrimination.
i9. Testifying to the power of information about race, social scientists have for decades sought to
construct experiments in which subjects would not notice a person's race. Only recently has this been
achieved. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides, John Tooby & Robert Kurzban, Perceptions of Race, TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE SCIENCES, Apr. 2003, at 173-79.
Until recently, it appeared that race-along with sex and age-was encoded in an automatic
and mandatory fashion. The encoding of race was thought to be spontaneous and automatic
because the pattern of recall errors that indicates race encoding occurred in the absence of
instructions to attend to the race of targets, and across a wide variety of experimental
situations. It was thought to be mandatory-encoded with equal strength across all
situations-because every attempt to increase or decrease the extent to which subjects
encode the race of targets had failed.
Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Knowing Thyself: The Evolutionary Psychology of Moral Reasoning
and Moral Sentiments, Bus., Sci., & EvIncs, Mar. 2004, at 91, 16.
120. See EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 59-87. Epstein analyzes the rational use of discrimination to
reduce firm governance costs. Firm homogeneity reduces conflicts among individuals within the firm
and facilitates communication and cooperation. Id. Of course, this assumes that sorting by race also
correlates with sorting by the relevant factors, i.e. class, region, religion, gender, political values, etc.
that produce the desired homogeneity. While such practices may reduce the governance costs within
the firm, they may also misallocate society's human capital and thereby increase opportunity costs for
society as a whole.
121. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
SCIENCE, Sept. 27, 1974, at 1 124. Their heuristics of "representativeness" (in which the probability that
object A belongs to class B is evaluated by the degree to which A resembles B), and "availability" ("in
which people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind") would seem to have implications for interracial
interactions. Id. at 1124-27. The representativeness heuristic suggests that when racial stereotypes are
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identity in a culture still struggling with its legacy of white supremacy
might increase the uncertainty involved in the interpretation of other
information. In this latter circumstance, information about race
undermines the decision maker's confidence in the reliability or accuracy
of other information or increases the uncertainty of inferences drawn
from that information. For instance, credentials held by African-
Americans are often undervalued when compared to the same
credentials held by whites. Some would blame this disparate valuation on
affirmative action programs, but the same differential valuation
phenomenon was common before such programs existed and persists
even in the absence of such programs.'22 The greater perceived
unreliability or uncertainty creates an incentive to acquire more
information, which is costly and can lead to the selection of an
alternative and cheaper choice not burdened with racial information.'23
Third, race can corrupt the judgment of decision makers without their
realizing it, and in contrast to the second category, cause errors to be
made without undermining confidence in the decision or creating
ambivalence about the inferences drawn.'24 In this instance, race (as
cognitively present, even those with some statistical validity, decisions will ignore base rate frequencies
and be insensitive to sample size. Id. at 1124-25. The availability heuristic confuses the easy
retrievability from memory with the frequency of occurrence and strong stereotypes, being easily
recalled, will be judged more statistically frequent than warranted. Id. at i 127. This latter heuristic also
results in biases of imaginability when assessments of frequency must be constructed from imagination
and are not stored in memory. Id. at I127-28. People evaluate frequency or probability from the ease
of imaginability, which do not necessarily reflect frequency. Id. Thus imagining an African-American
in a given role of competence may be difficult and thus judged infrequent even though the frequency
of actual occurrence is greater.
122. The difficulty that extremely successful African-American quarterbacks experienced trying to
continue playing at that position when moving from high school to the college ranks, or from there to
the professional leagues, illustrated this phenomenon and has been widely discussed by sports writers,
but this problem has largely ceased. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE at xix (1996).
A similar open and notorious phenomenon exists with respect to access to head coaching positions in
professional football, manager positions in professional baseball, or front office positions in either
sport. See generally id.
123. When the white candidate is chosen, since "white" is the norm, at the conscious level no
explicit racial information is involved.
124. See generally Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record (Nov. 2002) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Ms. Pager used
matched pairs of "testers" to audit the extent to which a criminal record affected subsequent
employment outcome. She found that a criminal record is associated with a fifty percent reduction in
employment opportunities for whites and a sixty-four percent reduction for blacks. The more dramatic
finding was that seventeen percent of whites with criminal records received call backs for interviews
with employers, more favorable treatment than the African-American without criminal records, only
fourteen percent of whom received call backs. See also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Hullainathan,
Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination (MIT Dep't. of Econ. Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=4229o2 (finding that fictitious resumes with African-American sounding
names receive markedly fewer callbacks for job interviews than comparable fictitious resumes with
White sounding names and that higher quality resumes for African-American names also elicit
substantially fewer callbacks than comparable resumes for White names).
December 20051
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
information) operates much like nepotism, but to the opposite effect.
Objective assessments about loved ones can be impossible for many
people. Race may have an analogous effect because, like nepotism, it
clouds judgment.
Another decisional effect of racial information results from the
social demography of American society, notably its pervasive
segregation. Employers and managers often use social and professional
networks to confirm the reliability of information provided by job
applicants and potential customers or suppliers. Paper credentials have
limited value. The most valuable reference is one known to the decision
maker, especially a reference with more substantial ties to the decision
maker than to the candidate. In this latter case, the risk of reputational
injury to the reference if it falsely confirms exaggerated and unwarranted
claims by the candidate assures the decision maker of the accuracy of the
reference. Unfortunately, given the high degree of segregation in our
society, African-American and other minority candidates are less likely
to have references also known to the decision maker.'25 This
phenomenon is less consequential for entry level jobs or small, episodic
business transactions, but the more senior and powerful the job, or the
larger and more significant the transaction, the more crucial it becomes
that decisions be based upon reliable information. At the top of the
employment and business transaction pyramids a considerable degree of
common interconnected networks exist, and this interconnectivity
increases the disadvantage of those who do not belong. Insiders who
share more social and professional networks with the decision maker can
have the substance of their nominal credentials and performance claims
more easily confirmed than outsiders. If, to overcome this disadvantage,
outsider candidates devote time and resources to establishing a
reputation within the social and professional networks of the decision-
maker, they have increased their costs, simply changing the form of their
disadvantage, but not eliminating it.
2 6
CONCLUSION
Volumes have been written about the many economic disparities
between white and black Americans.' 7 For decades, scholars have
debated the causes of the persistence of these inequalities.,28 Some blame
125. This phenomenon of social segregation, especially with respect to housing and the
neighborhood school (which reflect housing patterns), affects other minority groups to varying
degrees, Hispanics are less segregated than African-Americans and Asian-Americans are even less
segregated. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 5.
126. This would be analogous to establishing a business overseas in a foreign society and learning
the language, customs, and mores of that society in order to fit in.
127. See, e.g., MYRDAL, supra note 77.
128. See, e.g., ECONOMICS AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 37.
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the continuing legacies of slavery and Jim Crow;'29 others blame
continuing discrimination, while others seek answers in the structures of
the economy that perpetuate racial inequalities as class distinctions.3 '
Few emphasize the obvious-the anemic state of black business
activity.3'
In the dominant market economy on the planet in an era of global
interdependence, it is inconceivable that racial inequalities will disappear
so long as such wide divergences exist between the rates and scale of
African-American business ownership and the national average. How
much of this deficit is attributable to prior discrimination, and how much
to continuing racial barriers is unclear, and additionally, these two
categories are not analytically distinct. Discrimination in business to
business transactions is not prohibited. As a practical matter, it cannot
be. Given current trends in Supreme Court opinions, race conscious
business development programs will soon be barred.'32 In any event,
existing equal protection doctrine has so distorted these programs that
whatever marginal success they have had as business development tools
is purely coincidental, leaving market-based race-neutral programs as the
only remaining remedy to achieve economic equity.
Yet we lack the analytical tools and infrastructure to conduct the
kinds and varieties of economic analysis needed to inform policy
development. In the current intellectual climate the insights into racial
phenomena that economics might make available would lack credibility
within key African-American constituencies. The difficulty is thus
twofold. First, the credibility of economics must be restored in the eyes
of a constituency predisposed to view racial discrimination as a
psychological, sociological, and cultural phenomena, but doubtful that
economic analysis provides useful insights. Second, economic analysis
must proceed in such a way that it generates market-based policies that
plausibly promise to improve the situation.
Restoring credibility to economics, the first task and the start of
which this essay aspires to attempt, requires showing how Law and
Economics erred. More critical to this task than contesting its
assumptions, which others have done both much earlier and far better
than I, is to show how Law and Economics erred even by the lights of its
own highly debatable assumptions. To this end this essay examined how
Law and Economics scholars overlooked even the possibility that victims
of discrimination could experience psychic costs. When psychic income
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 84-io6 and accompanying text.
132. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constuctors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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effects for African-Americans are modeled along with those for whites,
the policy implications dramatically differ from those typically espoused
by Law and Economics scholars. Market competition provides no
assurance that nondiscriminatory firms will supplant discriminatory ones.
Antidiscrimination laws no longer appear inefficient or wasteful. Law
and Economics scholars, in extending an analysis developed to explain
firm specific phenomena to a complex historical and cultural
phenomenon like racial discrimination, ignored the limiting
assumptions'33 upon which neoclassical economics depends.
The second task involves conceptualizing race and racial barriers in
ways that generate policy proposals whose implementation might erode
the racial barriers constraining the opportunities available to minority
business firms. Thinking about race as a special type of information, with
a corrosive effect on both related information and on those who use it,
contrasts markedly with the neoclassical approach."3 It avoids the
diametric contradiction to the historical record that epitomized the Law
and Economics preference model, and it rejects the rational choice
theory at its core. 35
Conceiving the problem as, in part, an information problem suggests
some possible solutions. If information is part of the problem, either
insufficient information or defective processing of available
information,: then policies that reward obtaining additional information
or which create benefits for those that process information more
accurately seem likely to erode the racial barriers that inhibit the
formation and growth of African-American business firms.'37 Describing
racial phenomena in terms of information problems is also consistent
with the historical record and has considerable explanatory power.
Whether this approach or some other one ultimately proves more
133. The core assumptions have been articulated as "i) the assumption of rational, maximizing
behavior by agents with given and stable preference functions; 2) a focus on attained, or movements
toward, equilibrium states; and 3) the absence of chronic information problems (there is, at most, a
focus on probabilistic risk: excluding severe ignorance, radical uncertainty, or divergent perceptions of
a given reality)." Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Return of Institutional Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 6o-6i (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994). Another assumption
critical to the analysis of this article is that market exchanges occur between equals. See MARK
SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 35 (1996).
134. Neoclassical microeconomics assumes perfect information or at least no information
problems.
135. Rational choice theory is a useful analytical tool for certain purposes; it is not an accurate or
comprehensive description of reality. The challenge to critics of rational choice theory is to develop a
model with greater explanatory power and with fewer distortions or inadequacies.
136. An information approach allows incorporation of the irrational element of prejudice from the
psychological model.
137. See generally Robert E. Suggs, Bringing Small Business Development to Urban
Neighborhoods, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 487 (1995); Robert E. Suggs, Rethinking Minority
Business Strategies, 25 HARV. C.R-C.L L. REV. 101 (1990).
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beneficial, thinking about race in economic terms is essential to the
creation of business development policies, and without exponential
increases in the scale and sophistication of African-American business,
substantive equality will remain elusive.
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